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Abstract
We revisit the alleged retirement consumption puzzle. According to the
life-cycle theory, foreseeable income reductions such as those around retire-
ment should not affect consumption. However, we first recall that given higher
leisure endowments after retirement, the theory does predict a fall of total mar-
ket consumption expenditures. In order not to mistake this predicted drop for
a puzzle we focus on housing consumption which can be plausibly regarded
as complementary to leisure, and we control for the leisure change in our em-
pirical specifications, using micro data for Germany (SOEP), where housing
expenditures are observable as rents for the majority (60%), as well as dwelling
relocations. We still find significant negative impacts of the retirement status
on housing consumption, which is hard to reconcile with the life-cycle theory.
For retirees we also find significant effects of the income reduction at retire-
ment on housing. However, the effects are small in quantitative terms, given
the lock-in nature of past housing decisions.
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1 Introduction
Do people save too little? Or more precisely, do they undersave compared to the
benchmark prediction of the standard life-cycle model? (Modigliani and Brum-
berg, 1954; Friedman, 1957) Undersaving would mean that people are unable to
smooth their consumption paths according to the permanent-income hypothesis of
consumption and saving,1 and “the best evidence of undersaving is probably the
observation that, upon retirement, individuals, on average, reduce consumption
substantially.” (Akerlof, 2002, p. 424) That is the so-called retirement-consumption
puzzle. Since the consumption function is a central building block of most (macro-)
economic models, it is a fundamentally important issue whether the standard life-
cycle model provides a good approximation to reality or not. By conducting a new
test of the consumption-smoothing hypothesis we contribute to the literature on
whether the life-cycle theory of consumption is valid in general. The novelty of our
approach revolves around our focus on housing consumption and explicitly tak-
ing into account the discontinuous increase of available leisure time.2 First, these
expenditures cannot be substituted by the increased leisure after retirement (see
below). Second, we exploit the fact that the majority of the German population
do not own their homes, which means (a) that their housing expenditures are di-
rectly observable as rents paid, and (b) that they are potentially more prone to the
undersaving problem due to the absence of housing wealth.
There is no consensus in the economic literature on the existence of a retirement-
consumption puzzle, and the debate is still ongoing. On the one hand, there is the
position that “retired people are commonly believed to tailor their consumption to
a concept of income rather than to the value of their assets.” (Akerlof, 2007, p. 18)
Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) conclude after analyzing UK micro data: “We
argue that the only way to reconcile fully the fall in consumption with the life-cycle
hypothesis is with the systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information.” This
1Of course consumption smoothing may still imply rising or falling consumption paths given
differentials between personal time discount rates and net (after-tax) interest rates, but discrete and
sudden jumps are ruled out.
2The influence of hours worked (the labor market status) on consumption can be traced back at
least to Heckman (1974). Some parts of that insight seem to have been lost over the years and are not
always found in the recent literature, however.
2
finding would at least reject the life-cycle-cum-rational-expectations strong form
of the model, since “systematic” and “unexpected” together are incompatible with
rational expectations. Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) also reject life-cycle
models in favor of rule-of-thumb or mental-accounting savings behavior. Benartzi
and Thaler (2007) cite broad evidence that the standard model fails.3
On the other hand there is an important opposing strand of the literature which
argues that extended models of optimizing and forward-looking behavior are com-
patible with the empirical observations, see also Hurst (2008) for a survey, and
Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) for associating changes in consumption with these
arguments.
First and perhaps most fundamentally, Aguila, Attanasio, and Meghir (2011) do
not find any expenditure drop after retirement at all for non-durable consumption
goods, using micro panel data for the US. A very similar result for German expen-
diture survey data was found by Beznoska and Steiner (2012). However, taken at
face value these broad constancy findings would constitute a puzzle in the oppo-
site direction, as we will argue in the theory section below. Scholz, Seshadri, and
Khitatrakun (2006) claim that the household-specific predictions from an optimiz-
ing model with a realistic account of the environment are close to observed wealth
values; however, still 20% of households hold less wealth than would be prescribed
by the optimal decision model.
Second, the increased possibility of substituting market purchases through home
production of goods has been addressed repeatedly in the literature. Baxter and
Jermann (1999) found that allowing for home production explains the apparent
excess sensitivity of consumption to income that would otherwise invalidate the
permanent-income hypothesis. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find “dramatically” rising
time use on home production which substitutes for example the drop in expendi-
tures on food, such that food consumption stays roughly unchanged for retirees.
With German SOEP panel data Schwerdt (2005) finds a positive correlation be-
tween consumption reductions at retirement and (proxies for) home production,
3The retirement-consumption puzzle is just one manifestation of the general (alleged) excess sensi-
tivity of consumption to current income. For evidence on this phenomenon see for example Campbell
and Mankiw (1990); Attanasio and Browning (1995); Reis (2006).
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but he argues that not all of the fall of consumption can be attributed to that effect,
because there is a general rise in home production. Recently Lührmann (2010) re-
fined those findings for Germany by combining both consumer expenditures and
time use data pre and post retirement. She reveals a significant drop in expenses at
retirement which coincides with an increase in time spent on home production.
In order to circumvent the problem of measuring home production (whether it
rises and if so, by enough to substitute the consumption drop), we focus on hous-
ing. Housing cannot be substituted by home production, indeed it will usually be
a complement to the increased leisure time budget in the utility functions of in-
dividuals. The German institutional (and possibly cultural) environment is well
suited for our analysis because Germany is a country where less than half of all
households own their homes. This has the advantage that housing expenditures
are directly observable for many households as rents paid. For this reason we an-
alyze only non-home owners. Obviously this implies that our results will not be
(necessarily) representative for all individuals. Indeed, it is plausible that home
owners suffer much less from the under-saving problem precisely because of their
owned house or apartment, which represents cumulated savings. However, since
the life-cycle model is a hypothesis relating to all economic agents, focusing on a
suitable sub-group is still an informative approach.
Our main result is that we indeed find that (negative) income growth at (fore-
seeable) retirement helps to explain a reduction of housing consumption. There-
fore our test rejects the life-cycle model of consumption as a generally valid theory
of economic behavior. However, the effect is not large even for our subgroup of
non-homeowners which may explain the ambiguous conclusions in the existing
literature. The leisure change mainly serves as a control variable, but in our given
samples it does not have a significant influence on housing consumption, which by
itself is compatible with our theoretical framework.
In the next section we make explicit the theoretical background for housing
consumption in a stylized life-cycle model that incorporates leisure explicitly. The
dataset is introduced and some descriptive evidence is given in Section 3. Section
4 presents and discusses the estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory
2.1 A benchmark framework
To fix ideas, let us outline a version of the permanent-income hypothesis that is
extended to explicitly include leisure in the utility function. Each household i faces
the following utility maximization problem from current period t up to the end of








where β < 1 is the time discount factor, vi,t = (si,t, ki,t, li,t)′ is the vector of
arguments entering the utility function, the part ci,t = si,t + ki,t represents real ex-
penditures on market consumption goods and li,t is the amount of leisure in any
period t. For our purposes it is useful to differentiate between two components of
the consumption basket according to their utility properties with respect to leisure:
si,t denotes the amount of goods consumed by household i which are (partial) sub-
stitutes of leisure, and ki,t are those goods that are partial complements to leisure.
Below we will clarify how housing consumption hi,t is related to the inputs of the
utility function vi,t.
The standard intertemporal budget constraint that the household faces in pe-









(1 + rt+j)−jyi,t+j (2)
where rt+j is the relevant market interest rate, Ai,t is initial wealth, and yi,t+j denotes
future income. In the following we abstract from interest rate fluctuations and use
a constant r or even abstract from discounting altogether. The fact that the budget
constraint spans the entire life cycle means that liquidity or borrowing constraints
4Here we do not analyze the intra-household allocation or decision problem explicitly. See Lund-
berg, Startz, and Stillman (2003) for the scope of bargaining models in this context or Stancanelli
and Van Soest (2012) for spouses’ joint retirement decisions. For simplicity we also ignore a non-
deterministic end of the life cycle. Finally, we could in principle treat all parameters as household-
specific with an additional index i, but in the empirical part we make the standard assumption of
homogeneous coefficients except for household-specific fixed effects. Therefore we abstract from in-
dividual heterogeneity here for notational simplicity.
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are also ignored.5 For leisure consumption in each period there is a natural upper
bound li,t ≤ l¯ of how many potential hours there are in the day.
Because we do not address issues of risk and volatility we may choose a quadratic
specification with certainty equivalence for the instantaneous utility function u(vi,t):
u(vi,t) = z+ a′vi,t + v′i,tQ vi,t
where z is a constant and a is a three-dimensional coefficient vector, while Q is a
symmetric and negative-definite matrix such that u is concave (diminishing marginal
returns).









such that the marginal utilities are a+ 2Qvi,t which are required to be positive (non-




Negative-definiteness of Q in particular implies that all entries on the diagonal
must be negative, qss, qkk, qll < 0, and that qnnqmm − q2nm > 0 for all n,m ∈ {s, k, l}.
Intuitively, the cross effects qsk, qkl , qsl must not be too large.
Our assumptions about the substitution and complementarity relations between
the consumption components and leisure are then formally reflected as follows.
• qsl < 0: The consumption component si,t is a (partial) substitute of leisure li,t
for the typical household i.
5One of the leading explanations for departures from the LCH is liquidity constraints. However,
this argument is based on the inability to borrow against higher income later in life. Thus it applies
very little to agents at an advanced age. If those agents had been constrained at a young age this
merely means that on average their consumption later in life was inefficiently high compared to
the ex-ante optimum. The presence of earlier liquidity constraints has no bearing on the change at
retirement.
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• qkl > 0: The component ki,t is complementary to li,t.
• The remaining entry qsk reflecting the partial relationship between si,t and ki,t
is not restricted.
One of the main hypotheses in this paper is that the consumption of housing ser-
vices should be complementary to leisure, because intuitively each euro spent on
housing provides more utility if you have more time to spend at your home. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, housing consumption hi,t constitutes a part of ki,t, and
the corresponding utility cross effect with respect to leisure would be positive (qkl >
0).6
The permanent-income hypothesis is usually formulated in terms of monetary
expenditures on goods and services, and in that world permanent income would
amount to the sum of initial wealth and the present value of all future monetary in-
come streams, distributed as an annuity over the remaining life cycle. The result is
that current consumption should be equal to (the annuity value of) permanent in-
come. An implication is that in the absence of unexpected shocks the consumption
profile would be smooth, no matter how volatile the expected income develop-
ments are.
However, agents really seek to smooth (expected) utility, and the consumption
smoothing result relates to consumption in a broad sense, capturing everything that
enters the utility function. In our case we have leisure as an additional argument
in u(), and thus the life-cycle model of consumption does not necessarily imply
that expenditures on consumption goods and services c would also be smoothed.
Instead the optimal path of c and its components s and k also depend on the path
of l.
6For expositional purposes we treat ki,t as homogeneous in its utility effect. In general of course the
utility coefficients of the housing component would likely be different from the non-housing parts of
ki,t. However, the central hypothesis here is that the cross effects of any components of ki,t, including
housing hi,t, are positive with respect to li,t.
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2.2 Effects of leisure changes at retirement
In particular we focus on the retirement event where l is subject to a large positive
shift, and the occurrence of the event is largely determined by institutional rules.7
At retirement we typically have ∆yi,t < 0 and ∆li,t > 0, but the drop in current in-
come alone should not have an effect, because it is expected for a forward-looking
and informed household (in the absence of liquidity or borrowing constraints).
However, the equally expected but unavoidable rise of leisure would raise util-
ity, and since a discontinuous shift of the expected utility level cannot be optimal it
is clear that the rational reaction at retirement would be ∆ci,t < 0. This effect can
be interpreted as an endowment effect which exists in addition to the production
substitution effect, where the extra free time is used as a factor of production to
crowd out market purchases of food or similar items (home production).
This drop in expenditures at retirement creates a positive correlation between
current income and expenditure levels which could be mistaken for the famous
retirement-consumption puzzle but in fact would be a result of life-cycle theory. In-
deed, many analyses of the retirement consumption puzzle have tended to ignore
this issue. As we elaborate formally in this section, a drop in total consumption is
not sufficient to falsify the life-cycle theory. The reverse direction is also problem-
atic, however. Contrary to the standard interpretation, empirical demonstrations
as in Aguila, Attanasio, and Meghir (2011) that consumption around retirement is
constant would actually mean that households react non-optimally and would not
be compatible with the life-cycle model, at least under the maintained assumption
that leisure is a positive factor of overall utility.
However, even if ∆ci,t < 0 at retirement, this does not necessarily mean that
both consumption components si,t and ki,t would fall. Instead this depends on the
details of the preferences. Let us therefore provide a stylized but concrete formal-
ization of the situation at retirement. For simplicity we abstract from discounting,
7We do not literally claim that the timing is exogenous for all workers. In fact, in Germany it is
possible to choose the retirement age within certain limits. However, retiring prematurely (which
is different from a formerly existing possibility labeled early retirement –Vorruhestand) in Germany
entails pension cuts, and most workers do not find it attractive. So we treat the retirement event as
exogenous in that sense, leaving workers a focal option they typically do not refuse.
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and we assume that the units of leisure are chosen such that its monetary valuation
matches the overall price level for market goods and services. Then the life-time





(yi,t + li,t), (3)
and the corresponding annuity value for the current period is i¯ = T−1i I. The flow
budget constraint for the utility maximization problem can then be written as:
si,t + ki,t + li,t ≤ i¯ (4)
Furthermore we abstract here from labor supply decisions such that the paths of
yi,t and li,t are treated as exogenous. We denote this exogeneity with li,t = l¯i,t. The
flow utility maximization problem is then given by:
max
si,t,ki,t
ui,t(v¯i,t) = z+ a′v¯i,t + v¯′i,tQv¯i,t,
s.t. si,t + ki,t + l¯i,t ≤ i¯
where v¯i,t = (si,t, ki,t, l¯i,t). Of course the budget constraint (4) will hold with equality
and we can substitute out one of the choice variables, for example ki,t = i¯− l¯i,t− si,t.
We obtain the following simple maximization problem:
max
si,t
z+ assi,t + ak(i¯− l¯i,t − si,t) + al l¯i,t + qsss2i,t + qkk(i¯− l¯i,t − si,t)2 + qll l¯2i,t
+2qsksi,t(i¯− l¯i,t − si,t) + 2qslsi,t l¯i,t + 2qkl(i¯− l¯i,t − si,t)l¯i,t
The FOC yields:
s∗i,t =
0.5(ak − as) + i¯(qkk − qsk) + l¯i,t(qkl + qsk − qsl − qkk)
qss + qkk − 2qsk
In addition, the SOC requires that qss + qkk − 2qsk < 0 for a maximum, or qsk >
0.5(qss + qkk), which means that the cross utility effect between substitutive goods
s and complementary goods k must be positive or smaller in absolute value than
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the average of the own effects of s and k.
The budget constraint s∗i,t + k
∗




i,t)/dl¯i,t = −1 =
dc∗i,t/dl¯i,t. This implies that at least one of the components must be reduced. The
question is how the reduction in goods consumption is distributed between si,t and
ki,t. The effect of an (exogenous) change of the leisure amount l¯i,t on the optimal




qkl + qsk − qsl − qkk
qss + qkk − 2qsk (5)
Because the denominator is negative by the SOC, the expression (5) is negative if
qsk > qkk + qsl − qkl . Since the latter right-hand side expression is necessarily neg-
ative, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition is that qsk ≥ 0. Another sufficient
condition would be that qss ≥ qkk, because in combination with the SOC this would
imply qsk ≥ qkk > qkk + qsl − qkl . Therefore, while negativity of (5) cannot be strictly
guaranteed, it would seem quite likely.
According to the relationship ki,t = i¯− l¯i,t − si,t the change of s∗i,t translates into








Intuitively, the reaction of the substitutive good s should be stronger than that
of the complementary good k, or ds∗i,t/dl¯i,t < −0.5 < dk∗i,t/dl¯i,t. Comparing (5) and
(6) leads to the condition:
|qss| < 0.5(|qkk|+ |qss|) + |qsl |+ |qkl | (7)
For a stronger reaction of the substitutive good the own partial effect of s on
(diminishing) marginal utilities must not be too high, relative to the own effect of
k and the cross effects originating from l. The same sufficient condition as before
would apply here, namely qss ≥ qkk (|qss| ≤ |qkk|). Again, condition (7) is not
automatically fulfilled in this class of utility functions, but appears very likely to
hold in practice. Therefore we assume that it holds.
Given that the reactions of s and k must add to −1, it could also be the case
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that dk∗i,t/dl¯i,t > 0 (and thus ds
∗
i,t/dl¯i,t < −1), such that the reaction of k would be
positive. This is the case if:
qsk < qss + qkl − qsl (8)
The right-hand side expression in (8) can be positive or negative in general and
therefore the sign of qsk alone does not provide a definite answer. Also, notice that
in the special case qss + 2(|qkl |+ |qsl |) < qkk, the required negativity of (5) would
rule out (8).
Summing up, optimizing intertemporal behavior requires that total consump-
tion of goods and services is reduced given an exogenous increase of leisure, as
happens around retirement. Furthermore it is likely (although not guaranteed)
that the consumption of leisure-complementary goods is reduced less than that of
leisure substitutes. Depending on the details of preferences, complementary goods
and services –including housing– might even be consumed more instead of less.
It is important to recognize that these reactions would happen in response to
the rise in leisure, not because of the drop in income. Therefore, after controlling
for the leisure change the expected income change at retirement should not have an
effect, as in the traditional formulation of the life-cycle hypothesis without leisure.
2.3 Confounding effects
After presenting our stylized life-cycle framework with leisure and before moving
on to the empirical analysis, let us discuss in a less formal way other (fully rational)
influences that could play a role for housing consumption changes around retire-
ment.
For example, the search for a new home could be so costly in terms of forgone
leisure that it is optimal to postpone it until after retirement, when leisure is not
scarce anymore. Contrary to the effect in Section 2.2 this would just be an indirect
working of the leisure change, not a direct utility-based influence. However, it
would still be controlled for by including a measure of leisure, thus it remains true
that the observed income change should not have an effect conditional on these
controls. Only the effect of the leisure variable might be confounded. On the other
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hand, our sample is deliberately restricted to men beyond the age of 55 whose
children are typically not very time-demanding of their parents anymore. Note also
that the typical amount of hours worked per year is quite a bit lower in Germany
than for example in the US. Therefore it seems somewhat implausible that forgone
leisure should inhibit people from searching for a cheaper home. Finally, people
may hire agents; in Germany those are usually only paid in case of a successful
match.
Next, workers are geographically bound to some extent by the location of their
workplace. They are only free to move away when they retire, and housing might
be cheaper for example in rural areas farther away from economic centers. A
cheaper home then might not necessarily imply a reduction of the utility value
of the home compared to the old one in a more expensive location, such that there
would be a mismeasurement. In this case the observed move should then indeed
lead to a sufficiently different geographical location. In our available dataset we
cannot fully observe the geographical change, but this effect should be independent
of the income change amount. Instead it would be reflected only in the retirement
status dummy.8
Finally, in the case of “early” retirement, the income drop might actually be un-
expected, and no consumption smoothing would then be rationally expected. A
distinction between anticipated and unanticipated changes is empirically impor-
tant according to Blau (2008), Haider and Stephens (2007), or Smith (2006). There-
fore we control for the early retirement event, but after the 1990s this policy was
not used much anymore in Germany.
If we depart from fully rational explanations, there are many potentially rele-
vant behavioral economic hypotheses. For example, the existence of norms and/or
mental accounting could mean that for an agent her current income is like an enti-
tlement to spend or “norm”-al in the literal sense (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). This
would imply a dependence of (housing) consumption on current income, after tak-
ing into account lock-in effects that would weaken the correlation. Or it could be
8A pragmatic issue is that more detailed geographical information in the SOEP is subject to certain
usage restrictions. Future research could possibly incorporate such an analysis.
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that agents procrastinate: they might be perfectly aware that they should rationally
be moving to a cheaper home, but they do not act accordingly (O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999). This explanation in isolation would imply that agents used to have
a good reason to live in their expensive home. The most likely case is the space
requirement of children. Finally, another simple explanation is myopia, i.e. the
assumption that agents simply do not consider their future needs. In its extreme
form that would imply that no income changes ever lead to an adjustment of cur-
rent consumption until wealth is depleted. In general, myopia of course induces
undersaving and tends to prevent wealth accumulation.
Note that contrary to widespread conception the assumption of hyperbolic dis-
counting (present bias) alone is not sufficient to generate an excess sensitivity of
consumption to current income, as pointed out for example in Akerlof (2007, fn
39) by invoking the analogy to Barro’s well-known model with bequests (Barro,
1974): The future selves of an individual in a model with hyperbolic discounting
effectively take the role of the heirs in the dynastic model. Also, in a “golden-eggs”
model a la Laibson (1997) a rational agent with hyperbolic discounting preferences
(and who knows about her time inconsistent preferences) will invest in illiquid as-
sets to avoid temptation in the future. Effectively such an agent makes her future
selves liquidity-constrained. A rational agent with hyperbolic discounting would
therefore have invested in assets with a corresponding duration (time to maturity).9
Thus she would be able to smooth her cash flow and hence her consumption ex-
penditures.
3 Dataset and descriptive evidence
3.1 SOEP
To investigate the housing consumption behavior of people entering retirement we
draw on panel data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a
yearly micro-data panel which has been conducted in annual interviews of individ-
9In developed countries such as Germany those types of assets clearly exist and are quite
widespread; for example so-called “capital life insurance” contracts which are essentially savings
plans that pay an annuity or a lump-sum payment after retirement.
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uals and households since 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 in East Germany.10
It is well suited for our analysis as it contains detailed information on both the re-
tirement and the housing issues. From wave to wave respondents report whether
they have changed their employment status because of retirement and whether
they have moved to another apartment, including rental costs before and after. Re-
spondents also provide information about their household size, income and other
living circumstances. Moreover, this information is available over a long period of
time which enables us to gather a decent number of respondents who actually enter
retirement within the observation period. One drawback, however, is the fact that
household wealth levels are not provided in the SOEP, nor is total consumption
available (and by consequence also no current savings).
Despite the many advantages of longitudinal data, panel attrition may be a par-
ticular problem when studying moving behavior. According to the official doc-
umentation, panel attrition in the SOEP, related to households that were lost af-
ter they moved to unknown new addresses, is roughly 0.5% on average each year
(Kroh, 2009). If it does have any effect on our results at all, this attrition is expected
to bias our findings in the direction of the life-cycle hypothesis.
3.2 Sample selection
Due to some inconsistency in the wording of the SOEP questionnaires before 1993,
the retirement event cannot be deduced correctly, so we start with the panel wave
1994 (i.e. t− 1 starts at 1993). The latest wave we use refers to 2012. Given a massive
rent catch-up in East Germany from constrained levels in the years after unification,
we leave out East German observations before 1997.
As we want to compare the housing behavior of recently retired workers with
other individuals (or households), we do not restrict the sample to those going into
retirement. Nevertheless, in order to obtain a relatively homogeneous sample we
include men between the ages of 55 and 75, centered around the standard nominal
retirement age of 65.
An important feature of our analysis is that we focus on home tenants, thus ex-
10For a detailed description of the data set see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
14
cluding home owners. The main reason for this exclusion is that the current cost
of housing is unobservable for non-tenants. But it is clear that home owners tend
to stay in their apartments or houses after retirement. In general their behavior is
probably consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis to a larger extent than the behav-
ior of tenants, because the asset of a home itself constitutes a considerable savings
item for retirement. Therefore we acknowledge that in our setup we would find
non-consumption-smoothing results more easily than in a representative sample of
the whole population. If we find violations of the life-cycle hypothesis, this finding
might then not apply to the roughly 40% of the households in the SOEP who are
home owners.
The number of observations along the time dimension is of course different for
each cross-sectional unit. Due to the fact that some variables are constructed as first
time differences or lags we lose one observation in the time dimension for each unit.
3.3 Descriptive evidence
First of all we document the plausible fact that the amount of available leisure in-
creases substantially around retirement. The leisure time use information is gleaned
from a set of items in the SOEP questionnaire in which respondents are asked to re-
port the average amount of time per day spent on employment (including travel
time to and from work), errands (shopping, errands, citizen’s duties), housework
(washing, cooking, cleaning), childcare, other care activities (only since 2001), ed-
ucation or further training, repairs on and around the house, car repairs, garden
work, as well as hobbies and other free-time activities. Since we regard leisure time
as a rather broad category of one’s disposable time, our leisure variable is calculated
as the residual of a day’s 24 hours and the individual time uses reported (except ed-
ucation and hobbies). On an annual basis, hours are available for weekdays only
(weekends are reported bi-annually). For this reason, we focus on weekday time
use.
Since a small number of respondents report simultaneous activities totalling
more than 24 hours per day, we restrict the sum of all work activities to 18 hours per
day (thereby requiring at least 6 hours of physical rest on average). Employment-
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related time is taken as reported, and the remaining time uses are scaled down
proportionately if they exceed the upper bound.
Figure 1 reports both the distribution of changes for the subsample of retirers
as well as the separate distributions of the leisure levels for non-retired and retired
men, respectively. The mode of the change distribution appears around 8 hours
which would correspond to a standard full-time job.
The next fundamental fact consists of the reduction of current income after re-
tirement, displayed in Figure 2. Here it is interesting that the mode occurs just
barely below zero. Only few households experience income drops below -35%,
which is plausible given the replacement rates prevailing in the German pension
system for those cohorts. It is also interesting that a sizable part of the observations
displays rising income. As we consider household income, this increase may stem
from life insurance contracts that become due or a rising income of the spouse.
Hence, it could be the case that there is a different puzzle reflected in those obser-
vations, namely the possibility that many people in Germany even have saved too
much for old age, given the relatively high level of state-provided old-age pensions
and health care benefits, compared to countries like the US. However, that aspect
is beyond the scope of this paper.
One advantage of the SOEP data is that it provides rents paid by tenant house-
holds that we can use as a direct housing cost measure. Analogously to the leisure
and income changes of retirers we report in Figure 3 the distribution of rent growth.
The median is negative around -3%, but because of the skewness the mean growth
rate is positive around 7%. Because of the high variance it is not clear from this
univariate distribution whether the retirement event determines the location of the
housing consumption growth variable.
Apart from the measurement of housing costs in the form of rents, we will also
use the following binary variables extracted or constructed from the information in
the SOEP in order to analyze the housing consumption decision:
• mcoi,t (“move_cost”): Whether respondents answered “for cost reasons” as the

































Figure 1: Leisure rise at retirement. Upper panel: Distribution of average leisure
change for those male household heads with an observed retirement event (in daily
hours). Lower panel: Boxplots of the distributions of all observations, conditional
on the retirement status.
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Figure 2: Income drop at retirement. Distribution of average real post-retirement


















Average rent gr. post/pre-retirment
Figure 3: Housing rent changes at retirement. Distribution of average real post-
retirement rent level relative to pre-retirement level, per household, expressed as a
growth rate in percentages.
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0 14598 194 14792
1 23 84 107
Total 14621 278 14899
1997 onwards. Out of all 874 observed moving events, mcoi,t = 1 in 128 cases
(15%).
• mchi,t (“move_cheaper”): Whether or not a move to a cheaper home took place.
The information about the move event is given in the SOEP. The new home
is considered cheaper if ∆ri,t is negative (the growth rate / log-difference be-
tween this year’s and last year’s rent paid). Out of the 708 observed moving
events,11 292 lead to a cheaper home (41%)
In Table 1 we compare the incidence of these binary variables in the common sub-
sample where both are available. Indeed, in 70% of the lower rent cases (194 /
278) the respondents do not give priority to the cost argument, while in the major-
ity of moving-for-cost-reason cases (84 / 107, 79%) they do cut housing expenses.
Therefore the two variables are correlated but are not perfect substitutes.
4 Specifications and estimates
In all model variants our choice of control variables to account for the background
noise of residential mobility is based on and extends the estimation results of Tatsir-
amos (2006). Tatsiramos (2006) studied residential mobility of people over the age
of 50 in several European countries using the ECHP. As the German contribution to
the ECHP data set is an adjusted sample of the SOEP, we draw on those variables
that proved statistically significant in explaining moves in Germany in the specifi-
cation by Tatsiramos (2006). These include whether the respondent lost his spouse,
experienced a health shock (disability, not the continuing status, 3.5%), lives in a
11The underlying sample is smaller relative to the information given for mcoi,t (874 cases) because a
lagged time period is necessary for ∆ri,t.
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couple (77%) and with children (4.3%). In our specification we did not include liv-
ing in an apartment and whether housing costs are a burden nor household wealth
because we did not find appropriate panel information in the SOEP. In the esti-
mation by Tatsiramos (2006), entering retirement proved an additional important
determinant of moving behavior; we will naturally also include a retirement status
dummy in our equations, but the dependent variables are different.
Other control variables are time dummies, indicators for East (mean of 30%)
and North West Germany (referring to the states of Sleswick-Holsatia, Hamburg,
Bremen, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia; mean 38%), loss of spouse
(0.53%), regular employment status of spouse (9.5%), German nationality. Further-
more, the size of the home, the real rent, the change of household size as an integer-
valued variable, age squared, and the tenure in the current home (divided by 10 as
a scaling device) are also controlled for. Note that some of the variables are not
time-varying and therefore do not appear in fixed-effect specifications below.
4.1 Housing consumption reductions through relocation
The first part of our empirical analysis concerns the events of moving to a cheaper
home and/or for cost reasons. In principle all men (between 55 and 75) are included
here, irrespective of ever having switched into retirement or not.
For the binary dependent variables as defined before we use the following prob-
ability model in our panel context:
Pr(msi,t = 1|x) = Λ(αsi + x′i,tβs), i = 1...N, t = 1...Ti, (9)
where s ∈ {ch, co} indexes the different dependent variables and α are the unob-
served individual-specific effects. Note that x contains some time-invariant vari-
ables as well as time dummies. The time dimension for this unbalanced panel
varies between all theoretically possible values (1 to 19).
Λ() is the logistic CDF, meaning that we have chosen a (panel) logit model in-
stead of a probit model. For the probit class, a fixed-effects specification that does
not suffer from the incidental parameters problem is not available. In contrast,
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for the panel logit model it is possible to use a conditional likelihood which does
not depend anymore on the unit effects and which can be used to estimate the re-
maining parameters consistently. A random-effects specification requires relatively
strong assumptions regarding the unobserved heterogeneity, and as a practical is-
sue we encountered numerical problems with convergence of the random-effects
logit estimator algorithm with our data. Using a fixed-effects approach also facil-
itates the comparison with a recent dynamic specification method as shown be-
low. A standard Hausman test clearly rejects the pooled specifications in favor
of (conditional) fixed effects: χ2(18) = 58.3, p = 0.000 for the mcoi,t equation, and
χ2(18) = 154.2, p = 0.000 for the mchi,t equation.
Note that units where all outcomes are the same (all zero or all one over time) do
not contribute information to the conditional likelihood for the fixed-effects logit.
Hence below we report sample sizes without those units for the fixed-effects spec-
ifications; this is a feature of the conditional fixed-effects model and should not be
mistaken for an arbitrary sample selection.
In table 2 the results of our panel logit estimations with respect to the binary
dependent variables of moving to a cheaper home or due to cost reasons are re-
ported. Both variants include time dummies and further controls as mentioned in
the notes. The variables “relative income change” and “relative leisure change” are
constructed as interaction effects of the current income (or leisure amount) relative
to the pre-retirement level multiplied with the retirement status dummy. They cap-
ture the changes occurring at retirement. These variables would be zero throughout
for non-retiring households, but the variables are not time-constant in general.
The salient finding is that the retirement status clearly increases the probability
of reducing housing consumption by either moving to a cheaper home or mov-
ing for (self-reported) cost reasons. As discussed in Section 2.3, in the case of mch
(move_cheaper) some confounding effects may be partly responsible for this re-
sult; but especially in the case of mco (move_cost) this significant effect appears to
contradict the life-cycle hypothesis. The higher amount of post-retirement leisure
(“relative leisure change”, included with a year’s lag) indeed significantly tends to
prevent the move to a cheaper home, but it does not have that effect on the self-
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reported “move for cost reasons”.
In contrast, the income effects are only significant in the move_cost equation,
which is perhaps surprising. The negative effect of the past year’s overall income
level (irrespective of the retirement status) on the propensity to cut housing con-
sumption by moving is expected. But it is noteworthy that the effects of relative
income changes at retirement are estimated with a positive sign. Taking together
the baseline overall income effect (−2.36) and the additional effect after retirement
(2.19) in the move_cost equation, the post-retirement income level would have al-
most no influence on the probability to move for cost reasons anymore. This partial
result by itself appears consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis.
The coefficients in logit models are not quantitatively meaningful by them-
selves, and typically the marginal effects would be analyzed. Unfortunately, in
a fixed-effect framework this is not directly possible as the level information is lost
after purging the individual effects. A quantitative interpretation will be given for
the different approach in Section 4.2 below.
The results reported so far were based on a static logit specification, where a
dynamic dependency was only allowed indirectly through the variable of the past
tenure in the home. Intuitively, however, having moved to a cheaper home (or
for cost reasons) in the past year should negatively affect the probability of moving
(again) in the current year. This would amount to a dynamic logit specification. The
well-known econometric issue with that in a panel context is the incidental param-
eter problem which leads to biased estimates. A recent solution is the quasi-logit
model (quadratic exponential) proposed by Bartolucci and Nigro (2010), which can
be regarded as an approximate dynamic logit model allowing a conditional FE ap-
proach. The conditional distribution of the binary dependent variable in the model
is given as























where e∗t is a correction term; in particular, for t < Ti this correction term is
approximately e∗t ≈ 0.5γ (see Bartolucci and Nigro, 2010, p. 724), where Ti is the
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Table 2: Reducing housing consumption by moving (static)







































N, ∑ Ti 214, 2040 89, 810
log likelihood −318.73 −101.30
Notes: Panel logit estimates, FE – (conditional) fixed effects. Standard errors below
estimates, two-sided significance levels denoted by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%).
Definitions of variables (see also Section 4): “move_cheaper” – moved into
cheaper home, “move_cost” – moved because of (self-proclaimed) cost rea-
sons. Time dummies also included, as well as controls: age squared, loss of
spouse, couple, change of household size, East, Northwest, disability status,
employed spouse, unemployed, self-employed.
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individual-specific final time period, and thus β1 are (approximately) the only co-
efficients associated with the covariates x′i,t.
We have applied that estimation approach to dynamic versions of the speci-
fications of Table 2, and we report the estimates of γ and β1 in Table 3.12 The
lagged term appears quantitatively quite important but is significant only in the
move_cheaper equation. The coefficient point estimates of the retirement status
effect are reduced in both equations and are also estimated less precisely in this
dynamic specification compared to the previous static one, which leads to a loss of
statistical significance in the case of the move_cheaper equation. The other results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
4.2 Housing consumption pre- vs. post-retirement
As a second empirical approach we also construct from our panel information a
cross-sectional sample where only the men with an observed retirement event are
included. For those individuals we define four relevant variables to be explained:
1. Rent paid after retirement, relative to pre-retirement levels. (Average levels
over the observed time spans are used, expressed as growth rates from pre-
to post-retirement, g(ri).)
2. Size of the dwelling after retirement, relative to pre-retirement levels. (Also
growth of the average levels, g(si).)
3. Incidence of move_cheaper events after retirement, relative to pre-retirement
levels. (Absolute difference, normalized by the lengths of the observed time
spans.)
4. Incidence of move_cost events after retirement, relative to pre-retirement lev-
els.
The first variable growth of rent paid g(ri) directly measures the change of the cost
of housing occurring around the retirement event. With the second variable growth
12We have used the DPB package for gretl to achieve this, see Lucchetti and Pigini (2015).
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Table 3: Reducing housing consumption by moving (dynamic)
move_cheaper, mch move_cost, mco










































N, ∑ Ti 188, 1724 88, 785
log likelihood −235.67 −78.27
Notes: Quadratic-exponential quasi-logit panel estimation, see Bartolucci and Ni-
gro (2010); estimates for t < Ti are shown, see the text. Standard errors below
estimates, two-sided significance levels denoted by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%).
Definitions of variables (see also Section 4): “move_cheaper” – moved into
cheaper home, “move_cost” – moved because of (self-proclaimed) cost rea-
sons. Time dummies also included, as well as controls: age squared, loss of
spouse, couple, change of household size, East, Northwest, disability status,
employed spouse, unemployed, self-employed.
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of the size g(si) we attempt to control for some of the confounding effects: for ex-
ample a larger house in a rural area might be cheaper, yet yield higher utility than
a small expensive city apartment. However, this relationship is still ambiguous,
because a larger apartment in a bad neighborhood might also provide lower util-
ity than a smaller apartment in a good neighborhood. The last two measures are
somewhat unusual as they are based on the differences of the averages of binary
variables. We include them for comparison with the panel-econometric results in
Section 4.1, but notice that after differencing the normalized fractions these vari-
ables are not binary anymore. Also, in order to make the directions of the effects
comparable with the first two housing consumption measures we present the neg-
ative of the influences on the changes of mch and mco, such that a positive coefficient
always means a positive effect on housing consumption.
In Table 4 the cross-sectional estimates for these four variables are reported.
The leisure change relative to pre-retirement levels (second row) turns out as sig-
nificant only for the incidence of moves due to cost reasons (last column) with the
expected sign. In contrast, the income effect at retirement (first row) is significant
for the cardinal measures of rent growth and size growth. The positive signs of the
coefficients means that a larger income drop at retirement translates into a larger re-
duction of housing consumption, even after controlling for leisure changes, which
contradicts the life-cycle hypothesis as outlined in Section 2.
While we have marked the significance levels in this paper corresponding to
two-sided tests, the test of the life-cycle hypothesis is usually a one-sided setup
where the alternative hypothesis postulates a co-movement. From that perspective
all mentioned effects in Table 4 and earlier tables are significant at least at a 5% level.
On the other hand, the magnitude of the effect is certainly small: For example, a
typical drop of income after retirement by 30% would lead to a reduction of the real
rent growth by only 3 percentage points on average. In general, remember that the
estimates only refer to non-home owners and as far as they contradict the life-cycle
model they are likely to be larger than for home owners.
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Table 4: Estimation results in the cross-section sample of retirers







































































N 314 314 287 308
R2 0.224 0.231 0.052 0.085
Notes: OLS estimates in a cross-section consisting of men with an observed re-
tirement event at any time in the underlying sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses, two-sided significance at 10/5/1 per cent indicated
with */**/***. Only control variables with a p-value below 0.2 and a constant have
been retained (“–” denotes a dropped variable with p > 0.2).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to shed new light on the retirement-consumption puz-
zle. We have argued that predictions of the life-cycle hypothesis must be inter-
preted conditionally on the large increase of available leisure at retirement, a the-
oretical insight which is often neglected in the literature. Our analysis is focussed
on the consumption of housing, based on the assumption that housing enters the
utility function as a complement to leisure, and thus under the life-cycle hypothesis
it should typically be reduced less than other consumption goods at retirement.
Based on the behavior of 55 to 75-year olds in the German SOEP we first found
that (foreseeable) retirement events have a significant effect on moving to cheaper
homes and/or moving due to self-reported cost reasons in a panel econometric
analysis. We then also found for the cross-section of retirees that the income drop
at retirement has a (negative) effect on housing consumption as measured by rent
growth and dwelling size growth. As suggested by our theoretical framework we
controlled for the amount and change of available leisure time which turned out to
be significant in some specifications.
These findings imply that the smoothing hypothesis of the life-cycle model
of consumption and saving may be violated for the large subgroup of non-home
owners in Germany. This is interesting insofar as the conventional wisdom is that
“faced with large income changes, households seem to react in line with the PIH”
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan forthcoming, p. 28, who do not explicitly mention
the retirement consumption puzzle, however).
In principle our evidence confirms the existence of a retirement-consumption
puzzle, contrary to some recent statements in the literature. As the leading expla-
nations of this puzzle are given by behavioral economic theories, aggregate models
would have to allow for heterogeneous agents not only in the sense of different
endowments and shocks, but also in the sense of different behavioral rules in order
to capture these aspects of reality.
However, some qualifications of our results should be noted. First, our sample
was deliberately restricted to non-homeowners, and we expect the life-cycle model
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to be more accurate for home owners due to their systematically higher cumulated
savings that financed their home in the first place. Secondly, in some specifications
we did not find effects of current income after retirement. Finally, the elasticity with
respect to housing expenditure growth appears to be quite small. Therefore, we do
not believe that a general conclusion can be drawn on whether the life-cycle model
is still appropriate as an approximation, instead such a decision should depend on
the characteristics of the respective application.
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A Institutional information Germany
It may be useful to summarize some characteristics related to the German housing
market.
There is a means-tested subsidy called “housing money”: Wohngeld. For reg-
istered unemployed it was subsumed under general unemployment benefits and
social assistance (ALG II) starting in 2005 with the Hartz reform. Those who receive
Wohngeld are already in an “appropriate” apartment, so they should not have any
reason to move to a cheaper home. In any case, the subsidy is part of the measured
household income.
The time that must elapse after the tenant announces his desire to end a rent
contract until the contract legally ends had been subject to another reform: since
June 2005 it is generally only 3 months for tenants, whereas until August 2001 it
was up to 12 months dependent on the past contract duration. Between September
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2001 and May 2005 it depended on whether it was an old contract (old rules) or
new contract (new rules). In contrast, for landlords it has always depended on the
contract duration and mirrors the old rules for tenants (up to 12 months).
Here is a summary of historical regulations of rent increases applying to apart-
ments which are not “price constrained” (without Mietpreisbindung –note that there
are also apartments where construction was state-subsidized and rents are there-
fore price constrained). A very recent reform (in 2015) is irrelevant for our sample.
• Within 3 years the rent in an existing contract can only grow by 20% (not
counting recurrent costs like staircase cleaning or elevator maintenance etc.
(Betriebskosten), or modernization expenses.
• The increased rent may not exceed the “local standard comparison rent” (LSCR,
ortsübliche Vergleichsmiete) which is determined based on official surveys.
• Raising the rent requires mandated approval by the tenant; if the tenant does
not grant this, the landlord must sue the tenant to legally get the mandated
approval, and prove in court that the rent increase meets legal requirements
(e.g. conforms to LSCR).
• A contract with a new tenant may not specify a rent exceeding the LSCR by
50%, but within this limit the landlady is in principle free to choose which
amount she demands.
B Further information on the variables
B.1 The retirement event
The fraction of observations with a retirement event is 1.8%, where the construction
of the retirement event dummy is actually not trivial: In the SOEP questionnaire,
respondents who have entered retirement recently (since last year’s survey) can
be identified with a combination of questions (i) on the termination of the last job
within the past or the current year and (ii) on the reason for leaving that job. This
information is available and, to the best of our knowledge, reliable since the survey
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year 1993. We define the variable "entering retirement" as taking the value 1 if the
respondent reports the termination of his job since last year’s questionnaire and
old-age pension or early retirement as the reason for this event. Entering an early-
retirement scheme is also considered in an additional variable "early retirement"
which, correspondingly, takes the value 1 if the respondent reports the termination
of his job since last year’s questionnaire and early retirement as the reason for this
event. We interpret "early retirement" as an interaction variable which covers the
additional effect of entering retirement rather unforeseeably and therefore unantic-
ipatedly. In the SOEP questionnaire, the early retirement information is available
until the year 1998 only. Hence the variable is always zero afterwards. However,
if a respondent reports a (regular) retirement event in two subsequent years, we
interpret the first event as an early retirement and set the respective variable to 1.











−4 −2 0 2 4


































































0 2 4 6 8
tenure at home/10
35
Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2016/1  BARTELS, Charlotte und Maximilian STOCKHAUSEN 
Children’s opportunities in Germany – An application using multidimensional 
measures 
  Economics 
 
2016/2  BÖNKE, Timm; Daniel KEMPTNER und Holger LÜTHEN 
Effectiveness of early retirement disincentives: individual welfare, 
distributional and fiscal implications 
Economics 
 
2016/3  NEIDHÖFER, Guido 




2016/4  TIEFENSEE, Anita und Christian WESTERMEIER 
Intergenerational transfers and wealth in the Euro-area: The relevance of 
inheritances and gifts in absolute and relative terms 
Economics 
 
2016/5  BALDERMANN, Claudia; Nicola SALVATI und Timo SCHMID 
  Robust small area estimation under spatial non-stationarity 
  Economics 
 
2016/6  GÖRLITZ, Katja und Marcus TAMM 
Information, financial aid and training participation: Evidence from a 
randomized field experiment 
  Economics 
 
2016/7  JÄGER, Jannik und Theocharis GRIGORIADIS 
Soft Budget Constraints, European Central Banking and the Financial Crisis 
  Economics 
 
